by Kansu Yildirim
Translated from Turkish daily evrensel.net, June 28 / July 9, 2026
In his article “Turkish Capitalism and Absolute Nullity,” he argues that the process Turkey is undergoing is not merely a matter of intra-party or inter-leader parliamentary rivalry, but rather that economic transformations aligned with the direction of the global system have triggered political changes; In the article “Turkish Capitalism, the New Constitution, and ‘State Rationality,’” we opened up a discussion on how ideological and political consolidation has taken place in light of this transformation, the reorganization of the state, and the function of mechanisms such as the “new constitution.” In both articles, our focus was on the position Turkey has assumed in light of changes and diversifications in the imperialist division of labour.
Turkey is a structurally externally dependent country, whether in terms of its need for hot money, supranational institutional collaborations, or foreign market relations. External dependence—beyond being merely a phenomenon—is a fact that determines the nature of state power, the tendency toward separation or integration among the branches of government, the nature of the class composition within the ruling bloc, which sectors will receive greater investment on a cyclical basis, the degree to which the law is politicized, and the relationship between the state and society. For this reason, we must summarize external dependence and the current state of the world system.
The anatomy of dependency
Samir Amin, building on the observation that the capitalist world economy is characterized by a sharp division of labour between the imperial centre (countries of the global North) and the periphery (the dependent global South), argues that central capitalist states seek to monopolize the most profitable forms of production and establish control over global commodity chains, while aiming to periphery countries by preventing their independent development, aiming to keep them as dependent suppliers of cheap labour and raw materials. Instead of producing for their own national development goals, dependent countries produce goods and plantation products for core countries at low market prices and with cheap labour.
This picture remains largely valid today; in particular, nearly all impoverished Global South countries, which are heavily indebted under financial obligations, transfer the value they create to the core countries. The wealthiest 1 percent in Global North countries such as the U.S., the U.K., and France earned $30 million per hour from Global South countries through the financial system in 2023. According to research by Hickel, Sullivan, and Zoomkawala—which builds on Samir Amin’s work empirically measuring “unequal exchange”—the Global North transferred, or more accurately, appropriated, approximately $62 trillion from the Global South between 1960 and 2018. Turkey’s external debt, the vast majority of which consists of loans obtained through international banking and financial systems, accounts for 46 percent of its total external debt and amounts to $239 billion.
However, external dependence does not point to a long-standing, one-sided determinism under headings such as “international law,” “international relations,” or “international trade.” Particularly with China’s rise as an economic power and its growing dominance in global supply chains, political and economic positions worldwide, as well as hegemonic blocs and interstate relations within the framework of global trade, are shifting. In fact, this situation reflects the global “interregnum” (interim period) that global capitalism has been experiencing since the pandemic.
The anatomy of the “Interregnum”
The term “interregnum” is no coincidence. Derived from Antonio Gramsci’s now-famous metaphor, “the old has not died, the new has not yet been born; now is the time of monsters”, “interregnum” refers to an interim period in which structural resilience and order cannot be maintained. In recent years, representatives of the ruling class themselves have adopted this term.
During political discussions at the 2026 Davos Summit, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever used this metaphor to warn of an “interregnum” period in which the hegemonic order has dissolved and a new order has not yet been established. Various “Business Diplomacy” and strategic analysis reports published in the first half of 2026 also directly employ Gramsci’s concept to describe the current state of the global economic order:
• In the World Economic Forum’s strategic analysis published in April 2026, it was noted that the “interregnum” will not end on its own, and that a new and resilient global regime is needed to address the pathological symptoms of the old order,
• In the Stimson Center’s “Top Ten Global Risks for 2026” risk report, it is stated that the world is in a “protracted interregnum” (a prolonged period of transition),
• Morgan Stanley’s second-quarter “Global Macro Outlook, 2026” report notes that “the old economic order is dying, while new protectionist policies have not yet taken root.”
Minister Mehmet Şimşek, in a speech at an economic summit he attended, similarly assessed major global disruptions and geopolitical shocks, citing Gramsci’s words to highlight global instability and geopolitical shocks.
Warnings from Global North-centred political and economic institutions regarding geopolitical and geoeconomic risks are not unfounded. In its “Global Economic Prospects – June 2026” report, the World Bank notes that the global “interregnum” will continue amid a pessimistic outlook, based on the perspective that the shortage of energy and other essential commodities caused by the Iran-U.S.-Israel war will exert downward pressure on economic growth in major economies.
Drawing on the report, Michael Roberts summarizes the global economy as follows:
• Global growth is expected to slow to 2.5 percent this year; this will be the lowest growth rate seen since the pandemic. “The 2020s are turning into a lost decade.”
• Growth in advanced economies is projected to fall from 1.8 percent in 2025 to 1.5 percent this year, driven in particular by persistent and significant increases in energy prices.
• Emerging and developing economies are facing the weakest post-pandemic growth in per capita income. With the exception of China and India, per capita income levels in developing countries are unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels relative to advanced economies until after 2028. This situation amounts to nearly a decade’s loss in terms of income convergence.
• Gulf economies are also heading toward a recession due to disruptions in their primary source of income—exports—and their becoming targets of Iranian attacks. The region’s GDP is expected to contract by 2.6 percent this year.
• Amid one of the most intense clusters of global shocks since the 1970s, nearly half of the developing economies have been unable to fulfil the most fundamental promise of development—narrowing the income gap with the world’s wealthiest economies—since 2019.
Turkish capitalism has chosen to survive during this global “interregnum”—a period of several years marked by intensifying struggles for hegemony among imperialist blocs, escalating economic and military competition between the U.S. and China, and the intensification of regional wars and conflicts—through a model I have characterized as “aggressive growth,” which I have examined in previous articles in the context of specific sectors. The pillars of this model are energy, mining, defence and its supporting industries, the automotive sector and its supporting industries, and metals; the model is further supported by the transformation of Anatolia into a hub for logistics and transit trade.
The anatomy of aggressive growth: Turkish capitalism centred on the defence industry
The critical sector that has come to the fore during the global “interregnum” is the military-industrial complex.
Beyond enhancing military capabilities, the defence industry is the industrial ecosystem with the highest strategic and technological “multiplier effect”—one that has rapidly responded to Turkish capitalism’s long-standing demand for the production and export of high-value-added goods and has rapidly increased profit margins. Factors that set the defence industry apart include its high R&D intensity—which triggers technological breakthroughs and investments in other sectors such as aviation, aerospace, automotive, artificial intelligence, communications, and logistics—the advantage of a state-focused customer portfolio that is less susceptible to market fluctuations than other sectors, and the flexibility to use the products in both military and civilian applications.
The military industry, which has come to the fore particularly within the framework of Turkey’s post-pandemic strategy of export-driven, industry-based accumulation, is considered significant in terms of creating a production and employment ecosystem. Under the coordination of the Presidency of the Defence Industries, more than 1,100 projects are being carried out, supported by a broad supply chain and production network comprising approximately 3,500 companies. With thousands of SMEs supplying parts and services to large companies, the scale of production is expanding both numerically and geographically, which in turn is driving up revenue and profit margins.
Turkey’s military-industrial complex is improving export indicators—both in terms of volume and technology intensity—in line with the demands of the industrial bourgeoisie.
Military industry exports, which stood at $2.28 billion in 2020, $3.2 billion in 2021, and $4.4 billion in 2022, will reach $5.5 billion in 2023—a 27 percent increase—and $7.154 billion in 2024, including NATO and service exports. In 2025, they are projected to reach $10.054 billion, representing an increase of approximately 48 percent; this figure consists of $9.87 billion in goods exports and $184 million in services exports.
While the defence and aerospace sector’s share of total exports was 1.7 percent in 2022, this figure has risen to around 3.5 percent, and the sector is expected to see the fastest growth in its share in the coming years. The 2024 figure, however, remains at around 2.7 percent of total exports, which are projected to reach approximately $261 billion.
According to SIPRI data covering the 2021–2025 period, Turkey ranks as the 11th-largest arms exporter globally, with the top three countries for arms exports being Pakistan (16%), the United Arab Emirates (12%), and Ukraine (8.4%). During this period, Turkey increased its share of global arms exports by 122 percent compared to the previous five-year period (2016–2020) and ranks as the third-largest exporter of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa, following China and Russia.
For the first time, two defense industry companies have made it into the top 10 of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s (ISO) “Top 500 Industrial Enterprises” list. TUSAŞ and ASELSAN, which ranked 11th and 17th, respectively, in the previous year, have secured spots in the top 10 by increasing their sales from production to 140.9 billion and 130.2 billion lira, respectively. This momentum in the sector is also reflected in export figures; the total exports of the 11 defence companies listed by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry reached $6.773 billion.
In Turkey’s military trade in recent years, there has been a notable increase in armed and unarmed UAVs, ammunition, smart missile and rocket systems, fully and semi-ballistic military ground vehicles and component manufacturing, as well as weapon turrets of various calibres mounted on these vehicles and simulators. Leading companies in the market—such as BAYKAR, ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, HAVELSAN, and KOÇ/OTOKAR—prefer to sell integrated packages consisting of “platform + ammunition + electronic systems and software” to countries like Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Poland, Romania, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines, Bangladesh, and various Central Asian countries.
Beyond the success of product sales, these state-owned companies use integrated package sales—comprising “platforms + ammunition + electronic systems and software”—to secure strategic dependence and operational superiority through services such as maintenance, repair, and upgrades. As noted in the introduction, Turkey—a country in a position of external dependence—has been striving in recent years to reverse this asymmetrical relationship, creating areas through its defense industry where it can establish relatively dependent relationships at the military and economic levels in certain countries and regions.
Turkey’s performance in the defence industry cannot be explained solely by a dominant “state mind” in domestic politics and the national market, nor by the success stories of individual company founders. It is taking place as a result of the opportunities provided by the military and political pursuits of the countries of the global North—some of which seek to perpetuate colonial relations with the Global South, while others strive to establish superiority over China and territorial power blocs such as BRICS—amid conditions of a global “interregnum.”
Turkey’s “aggressive growth” strategy necessitates a state form based on the concentration of power during this period of the Western imperialist bloc’s strategic pursuit. The expansion of productive capital groups—such as the defence industry—in the international market is linked to this situation and serves as a factor reinforcing Turkish capitalism’s economic and political dominance in the Central Asian market, particularly through North and Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region, and Azerbaijan. The aggressive growth strategy is viewed as a lever to organize the country’s territorial potential as geo-economic power. In line with this strategy, the aim is to reshape relations with NATO.
The Trump administration’s formal notification to Congress of its intention to sell jet engines worth over $700 million—to be produced by General Electric for use in Turkey’s KAAN national fighter jet project—and its decision to give the F-35 program the green light once again are part of this broader picture.
NATO 3.0 and Turkey’s position
This is why the NATO summit to be held in Ankara on July 7–8 is of vital importance to the government. In a speech delivered this week ahead of the summit, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte referred to the NATO 3.0 concept, noting that Aselsan—Turkey’s largest defence electronics company—is spearheading a Turkey-centred transformation of the defence industry that will benefit all NATO members, and that a comprehensive defence industry day will be organized as part of the Ankara Summit.
The “NATO 3.0” concept—in short—is characterized as the “spirit of a Europe-centred defence pact,” in which the relationship between the U.S. and Europe will be recalibrated, the geographic scope of U.S. defence strategy will shift from Europe toward the Indian -Pacific region, the concept of collective defence against China and Russia will take centre stage, member countries aim to increase their defence and security spending to 5 percent of their GDP, and military security will be complemented by economic security (in areas such as energy, semiconductors, and valuable mineral resources)—it is an initiative of “strategic rebalancing.”
As Mark Rutte has explicitly stated, Turkish capitalism is positioning itself in alignment with the NATO 3.0 concept through both geopolitical power (a strong and operationally proactive state apparatus) and geoeconomic power (the defence industry and related sectors). Rutte’s emphasis on the need to strengthen the defence industry within a transatlantic framework and his assertion that “this industrial base extends from California to Turkey” is of critical importance.
Turkish capitalism has prioritized integration into the global military-industrial complex; the form of the state and the political regime are also being restructured accordingly. The NATO Summit is viewed not only as an event where the political leadership seeks to address its short-term interests but also as a consortium that will leverage the multiplier effect of the defence industry to strengthen industrial production—and thereby the economic and political representation of the defence industry bourgeoisie centred around the military-industrial complex.
There is an organic link between the “aggressive growth” strategy, the policy of power concentration, and Tom Barrack’s proposal of a “benevolent monarchy” model for the Middle East. Both as Turkish capitalism organizes itself in other regions (through Turkey’s military and civil society activities in areas such as Northern Syria, North and East Africa, Cyprus, and the MENA region) and as Turkish capital internationalizes, (particularly the growth of the defence industry, energy, mining, transportation, and healthcare sectors), it is necessary to ensure coordination, eliminate factions within the state that would disrupt this harmony, reorganize the ruling bloc, and suppress opposition and the labour movement in the social sphere. This is only possible through a “strong state.”
In the fourth article of this series, we will attempt to discuss the restructuring carried out in accordance with the security concept shaped by the international division of labour.
NATO’s $1.5 trillion global military industrial complex: the military ‘Common Market’ project in the Draghi report
Ahead of the 36th NATO Summit, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte described the transatlantic scale of the global defence industry, stating, “This industrial base stretches from California to Turkey.” In an article titled “What Europe and NATO Must Do to Be Ready for War” (“What Europe and NATO Must Do to Be Ready for War”), they updated the line to “from California to Kyiv, from Copenhagen to Warsaw, from Oslo to Ankara” to emphasize Europe’s position.
At the NATO Summit held in Turkey, member states signed agreements totalling $50 billion. Signed with the words, “The hum of machines must turn into a roar. The money is ready, and much more is on the way,” these agreements served as the spark for a new security consortium.
The NATO Summit holds distinct and symbolic meanings for member states based on their respective geopolitical and economic conditions, as well as shared significance in terms of regional demands and needs. The pursuit of “partnership” is among the primary factors that make the summit significant. Based on this, we can grasp the importance of the emphasis placed in the article on Europe’s military stockpile and capacity shortfall, as well as the need for the civilian industry to play a greater role in military production.
Recognizing its continental shortcomings in political and military integration in the wake of the war in Ukraine, Europe has launched a defence industry-focused transformation process since 2022. Since the end of the Cold War, a multidimensional transformation has been on the agenda, including the reorientation of military spending toward productive capital investments, increased intergovernmental cooperation, and the rebuilding of defence industry capacity. However, the current wave of integration is a product of the post-2022 era, aimed at reviving the collective imperialist reflexes of the Western bloc. While war-related factors are at the forefront, industrial policies aimed at securing the Western bloc’s hegemonic supremacy are equally decisive.
In his article titled “A Post-American Europe Must Build Its Own Power” (“A Post-American Europe Must Build Its Own Power”), he noted that although Europe is economically strong, it has failed to translate this strength into political, military, and technological dominance; that it is becoming increasingly dependent in the new multipolar world; and that while the U.S. is part of the transatlantic alliance, its interests are increasingly at odds with those of Europe.
Lars Sandahl Sørensen, CEO of the Danish-based Dansk Industri, similarly noted in an article that although there are large amounts of savings and capital in Europe, these resources are not sufficiently directed toward productive investments, attributing this not so much to a lack of financing as to a fragmented internal market.
Criticisms and concerns that have come to the fore in discussions about Europe’s future over the past few years centre on the idea that Europe has lost its hegemonic superiority and the advantages it provided, has lost its relative dominance in production and trade capacity, and that the fragmentation of the internal market has made Europe dependent.
Global macroeconomic data also corroborate these assessments. The European economy has experienced a significant loss of relative weight over the past 40 years. Europe’s share of the world economy, which accounted for approximately one-fourth in the 1980s, has declined to about 17–18 percent today. During the same period, Europe’s potential growth rate has also fallen from around 2 percent to 1 percent.
From Europe’s perspective, the new security concept—or, in other words, the new Atlantic security paradigm known as “NATO 3.0”—comes into play and fulfils its function precisely here, in terms of reestablishing not only military and economic integration but also ideological and intellectual consolidation. Strategy documents published by the European Union (EU), NATO, and member states over the past two years demonstrate that the defence industry is not solely focused on military and regional security; rather, it plays a vital role in helping Europe regain its lost global competitive edge, secure technological sovereignty, and ensure the resilience of the industrial ecosystem.
As a first point of reference, we can look at the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) “Defence Data 2024–2025” report. Total defence spending by EU member states reached 343 billion euros in 2024, and spending of 381 billion euros is projected for 2025. During the same period, defence investments are expected to rise from approximately 106 billion euros to 130 billion euros, while R&D spending is expected to increase from approximately 13 billion euros to 17 billion euros.
We also see this trend in the text of the report published by NATO in 2025 regarding the expansion of defense industry capacity. Among the key findings highlighted in the report are the issues identified by von der Leyen and Rutte: high-intensity conflicts require ammunition and weapons systems far exceeding current production capacity, and the war in Ukraine has exposed the disadvantages of the “just-in-time production” model and low stockpile levels that have been in place in NATO countries for many years.
The new security concept is shaped not so much by the size of military forces as by ammunition production capacity, access to critical raw materials, the resilience of supply chains, and the industry’s ability to rapidly scale up production capacity during times of crisis. In this regard, long-term government orders, joint procurement mechanisms, the harmonization of production standards, and the expansion of the defence supply chain emerge as key policy tools.
Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s article titled “Europe Must Face the World on Its Own” summarizes Europe’s current shortcomings in the defence industry. According to the article, the fundamental problems of the European defence industry are insufficient production capacity, a lack of coordination in production, and the fact that production is organized according to national priorities rather than continental integration.
Although Europe calls itself a “union,” European nations independently produce similar weapons systems; there are 12 different main battle tanks, more than 20 fighter jet models, and numerous different armoured vehicle and warship platforms across the continent. This diversity in platforms makes production, maintenance, training, spare parts procurement, and logistics processes complex and costly. Consequently, not only are economies of scale absent in the defence industry, but this situation also makes it difficult to act in unison on defence matters.
According to the article, joint defence procurement by EU countries accounts for less than approximately 20 percent of total equipment procurement. While this prevents Europe from converting its large defence budget into effective military capabilities, the fragmented nature of production chains also limits the production of ammunition and critical equipment during times of crisis. This is precisely why the NATO Secretary General is calling for a “revolution in the defence industry.”
The text that most clearly illustrates the dynamics of the military-industry-focused transformation in Europe’s production infrastructure—and is the most significant document (commissioned at the request of Ursula von der Leyen)—is Mario Draghi’s 2024 report titled “The Future of European Competitiveness.” Draghi argues that the fundamental problem facing the European economy is not so much low growth as it is weak productivity and a fragmented industrial structure. According to the report, Europe cannot sufficiently achieve economies of scale in the face of U.S. technological leadership and China’s state-supported industrial policies. This situation becomes even more pronounced in the defence industry.
In Europe, numerous different tanks, fighter jets, armoured vehicles, frigates, and missile systems are being developed to perform similar functions; national production models lead to the fragmentation of research and development resources, small production runs, and high unit costs. Draghi therefore recommends the development of common European platforms, the expansion of joint procurement mechanisms, and the strengthening of cross-border defence industry integration.
One of the report’s most striking recommendations is the finding that an additional annual investment of 750–800 billion euros is needed for Europe to regain its competitive edge. It is noted that a significant portion of this investment must be directed toward strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, energy systems, and the defence industry. In this way, the defence industry becomes central not only to security policies but also to Europe’s new industrial policy and technological transformation strategy.
One of the most significant outcomes of this strategic transformation is the expansion, on a European scale, of an industrial network comprising both large corporations and SME-type companies. In Germany, the shift of numerous “Mittelstand” businesses—similar to our SMEs—from the automotive and machinery sectors toward the defence industry; in France, the integration of technology startups in the fields of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity into defence projects; the integration of heavy industry into ammunition and armoured vehicle production in Poland; and the expansion of the defence supply chain to include hundreds of SMEs in the United Kingdom—all point to a common trend: the civilian industry is increasingly becoming an integral part of the military industry.
However, even if Europe were to theoretically assume the role of an autonomous power, in practice, the United States’ dominance over military production and supply chains is not of a nature that would allow the balance of power to shift in the short term. An examination of the national distribution and economic scale of military industry companies operating in NATO member countries reveals that the overwhelming majority of the global military industry’s $1.27 trillion market is held by U.S.-based companies. Although companies such as Rheinmetall, Leonardo, Saab, Thales, and BAE Systems continue to grow in Europe, U.S. firms—including Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics—retain their market dominance.
When EDA data, NATO’s industrial capacity analyses, and the Draghi Report are evaluated together, it becomes evident that Europe is striving to build a new strategic paradigm over the next decade that integrates security policies with industrial policies. In this context, NATO’s role will be to coordinate production to create a “common market,” ensure the operation of the global military factory in the regions identified by Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Rutte, and plan relations among member states under U.S. guidance.
The most uncertain and challenging question regarding NATO’s new security concept and Europe’s response is whether arms companies will abandon their long-standing monopolistic tendencies in a trillion-dollar production and competitive environment. How long can a plan—based on the assumption that companies that have grown through a war economy will remain “peaceful” toward one another during wartime—remain viable? Or, for how long can member states set aside their nation-state reflexes and align their regional interests?
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References:
Hickel, J., Sullivan, D., & Zoomkawala, H. (2021). Plunder in the Post-Colonial Era: Quantifying Drain from the Global South Through Unequal Exchange, 1960–2018. New Political Economy, 26(6), 1030–1047.
Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Harvester Press.
Emmanuel, A. (1972). Unequal exchange: A study of the imperialism of trade. Monthly Review Press.
Michael Roberts, “Iran and the US: a ceasefire that lasts?”
Jason Hickel, “What is delinking?”