Yusuf Akdağ
This article was originally published in Teori ve Eylem, No. 65.
In the first quarter of the 21st century, those who view China—the world’s second-largest capitalist economy and one of the most important forces in inter-imperialist competition—as “socialist” or “a great power advancing toward socialism” are not limited to China’s and the CPC’s leaders. Leaving aside the parties and organizations that have turned into counter-revolutionary forces in collaboration with the bourgeoisie, inspired by the CPC, there are still those in various countries, including Turkey, who believe that “a socialism unique to China is being built,” despite their critical approach to some of its policies. For example, Korkut Boratav, one of Turkey’s leading economists, notes that the “most common mode of production” in China is capitalism; that the commodification of labour has become widespread; and that an article has been added to the Constitution guaranteeing private property (provided it is “rightfully acquired”). He adds, however, that state and cooperative forms of ownership are widespread in strategic industries, banking, central bank reserves and land, and power remains in the hands of the vanguard party (the CPC), which claims to represent the working class and peasantry. Boratav notes that the information available is insufficient to “strictly classify China as a social formation,” adding, “If the bourgeoisie had succeeded in seizing control of the CPC leadership and the state apparatus, I would unhesitatingly call it capitalist. In short, the ‘ultimately expected’ situation, i.e., the rule of capital, has not yet materialized in China. Moreover, the ruling power, which wields considerable control over the economy, is aware of this danger; it possesses the power to prevent the ‘unchecked expansion of capital.’” Furthermore, Boratav says, the realization of Xi Jinping’s goal to transform China into a “prosperous, powerful, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, beautiful, and modern socialist society” by the middle of the 21st century “would, in my view, be a gain for all of humanity.” [1]
The publishers of Theory and Politics [in Turkey] have released a special issue on China and organized a symposium, and they argue that despite of its mistakes CPC remains a “Marxist party,” and that despite problems arising from difficulties, China is also a “socialist country.” [2]
This article is not a response to Boratav or others. The “observations” above are cited merely as data.
While there is no doubt that the establishment of a socialist society in a country the size of China would be a major achievement for the world’s working class and all the oppressed peoples, the issue, which this article addresses, is whether today’s China has any connection to socialism, and whether the CPC has built socialism.
In terms of answering this question, it can certainly be argued that the economic and social policies of the period after the 1949 people’s revolution served as a catalyst in terms of the “Chinese Socialism” claim and the worldview of “Chinese Marxist-Leninists” (!), led by Mao Zedong: The CPC has claimed that it remained committed to the goal of building socialism by linking its economic policies—which also reflect its ideological approach—to China’s unique conditions, and has sought to portray the growing strength of the bourgeoisie and capitalism in China, as well as policies opening the Chinese market to international capital, as connected to scientific socialism and the NEP implemented by the CPSU under Lenin’s leadership. The approximately seventy-year journey of social development in China contains numerous data points that shed light on the substance of these claims. The discourse of “Chinese socialism” persists, and references are made to the views of Mao Zedong, also characterized as Maoism. [3] China’s current reality—specifically, the nature of the Chinese economy and the relationship between the CPC’s ideological views and the materialist Marxist worldview and theory of revolution—constitutes fundamental data and indicators regarding the validity or lack thereof of the claims made by current CPC leaders, particularly Xi Jinping, that the construction of a unique form of socialism in China is ongoing.
China’s current economic and social reality, along with the political and ideological perspectives that guide it through the practice of “process-oriented construction,” are explanatory in this regard.
The Chinese Revolution and the CPC’s “Market Socialism”
With the support of the broad masses of poor peasants, Chinese revolutionaries seized local power and, in a process that culminated in the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (October 1949), the CPC faced the challenge of the revolutionary transformation of society; improving the situation of poor and landless peasants; and establishing and consolidating the revolutionary power of the working class against the bourgeoisie. According to the theory of Mao, the leader of the Chinese Revolution, the working class, the broad peasant masses, and the national bourgeoisie would build this new process under the leadership of the CPC representing the entire nation. [4]
The socialist industrialization of the country would be achieved gradually and step by step, and the agricultural sector would be transformed through cooperatives. [5] The idea of reconciling the proletariat with the national bourgeoisie and “transforming” the bourgeoisie also included the seeds of an alliance with different sections of the bourgeoisie. The policy of “peaceful coexistence” was declared at the 7th Congress in April 1945. Mao, who said “All Chinese people must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism, there is no third road,” argued that the ideological and political line determined everything, spoke of ideological struggle against the bourgeoisie and revisionism, and advocated alliances with other forces against the power or powers he considered as the main enemy. [6]
However, despite pointing out that the unity and struggle of opposites pointed to a social reality, Mao was distant from the view that class struggle should be expanded to the elimination of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie:
“Being a bourgeoisie in a colonial and semi-colonial country and oppressed by imperialism, the Chinese national bourgeoisie retains a certain revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree, even in the era of imperialism,… and it may ally itself with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready to oppose.” [7]
Mao, who stated that their own administration would represent the entire nation, said, “In the stage of democratic revolution there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people’s republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises.” [8] This policy was described at the CPC’s 7th Congress in April 1945 as the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of China and was put into practice through the revolution. [9]
The new social order and system, with characteristics different from capitalism, required the implementation of policies aimed at eliminating exploitative relations under the political domination of the proletariat, along with the need and necessity for a transition phase. The advancement of the people’s revolution toward the construction of socialism under the leadership of the proletariat—the seizure of monopolies and the lands of feudal lords and large landowners for an uninterrupted transition to socialism—constituted the first steps toward nationalization in industry and cooperativization in agriculture. The policy to be implemented was of vital importance for the country and the people, as well as being decisive for the construction of socialism. For this reason, the economic policy to be implemented had to serve to gradually eliminate surplus value exploitation.
However, Mao Zedong and the CPC did not merely view popular power as a power-sharing arrangement between the working class, the peasantry, and the national bourgeoisie (the small and medium bourgeoisie); they also believed that it should be maintained for the process of building socialism, which they stated could only be achieved over a very long period of time. The rationale was that the material foundations of socialism were weak due to the backward level of capitalist development. The social and economic structure of Chinese society in the first half of the 20th century and the extent of its relations with the imperialist-capitalist world system made it necessary for the Chinese working class and its party to mobilize the sections of society whose interests were opposed to imperialism, feudalism, and the collaborationist bourgeoisie, around the leadership of the proletariat. From this perspective, the CPC made the national bourgeoisie a partner in power throughout the entire process of building socialism.
According to Mao, the contradiction between labour and capital and the different demands of each class did not or could not be an obstacle to ensuring the harmony of these different demands and to the different classes (the national bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the working class) jointly carrying out the political, economic, and cultural tasks of the “new democratic state.” His “new democratic constitutional rule” was the “joint democratic dictatorship of various revolutionary classes over traitors and reactionaries.” Mao Zedong advocated that “one-third of the seats” in the new democratic government be given to representatives of the middle bourgeoisie and enlightened gentry, referring to this as the “three thirds system.” [10] According to his claim, the “600 million people led by the working class and the Communist Party” had united like a single fist to undertake the noble task of building socialism!
He said that “the contradictions between the exploited classes and the exploiting classes have both irreconcilable and reconcilable aspects,” and in the second half of the 1950s, which he identified as the period of socialist construction, he viewed the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as part of the “contradictions among the people.” According to him, “In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the national bourgeoisie, while its support of the Constitution and its willingness to accept socialist transformation constitute the other.” This situation of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision” was linked to China’s concrete historical conditions. [11]
Mao, famous for his eclecticism, spoke of the inevitability of the continuation of the new period’s power policies for a long time, while also saying that “to consolidate the new democracy and continue to consolidate it forever is to follow the path of capitalism.” [12] In a later period, he also said, “With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China; therefore the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class.” [13]
With the 1949 Revolution, large enterprises owned by the “comprador bourgeoisie” and foreign companies were nationalized. As a result of nationalization, 59% of capital came under state control. The state controlled 60% of the metal industry and textile industry through electricity and steel production. [14] The lands of large landowners were confiscated and distributed to poor and landless peasants. [15] As a result of the plan implemented with a $300 million loan from the Soviet Union and the assistance of Soviet engineers, iron and steel production increased fourfold in four years, 300 million landless or poor peasants became landowners under the land reform, and 91.7% of peasant families joined cooperatives. [16]
However, the wealthy peasantry and the national bourgeoisie were left untouched. Small and medium-sized capitalist enterprises, as well as capitalist relations in agriculture, were allowed to continue for the same reasons (the backward level of economic and social development). The “national bourgeoisie” was growing stronger, and private sector enterprises were multiplying. By 1953, their number had reached 150,000, and 37% of China’s industrial production was carried out in these enterprises. The rules of the market economy were operating in the countryside; buying and selling land, choosing what to plant, marketing products, and setting prices were all up to the peasants themselves. The differences between urban and rural areas were growing, and the privileged lifestyle of the bourgeoisie, who owned private property, was becoming increasingly visible. Individual land ownership and the peasants’ freedom to buy, sell, and rent land; to use wage labour; and to freely sell their products on the market increased inequalities among the rural population.
The economic policy pursued under the influence of internal party factional struggles followed a zigzag course. The rise to power of the Khrushchevites in the USSR and the gradual deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, along with disagreements within the party over whether to prioritize heavy industry or light industry and agriculture, influenced economic policy, while capitalist development, presented as being in line with the goal of socialism, gained momentum. During the period from 1957 to 1966, while this zigzagging economic policy was being implemented, Mao Zedong’s leadership and successive campaigns such as “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend,” “The Great Leap Forward,” and “The Cultural Revolution” caused chaos and destruction.
When Deng Xiaoping, who was declared one of the “greatest capitalist roaders,” reemerged within the Central Committee, he attributed the problems to a departure from the market economy; the CPC Central Committee, which he headed, defended market rules in line with the view that commodity production and the law of value should not be ignored in production and circulation. In line with the “Open Door” policy announced in the mid-1970s, it was decided to establish special zones open to foreign capital investment and to engage in production in partnership with foreign-owned companies. Foreign capital would be able to establish companies. Bank deposits and housing confiscated during the Cultural Revolution would be returned, suspended interest payments would be resumed, and the national bourgeoisie would be able to collect accumulated interest income. [17]
Deng Xiaoping, who spoke of “Chinese-style socialism,” linked the economic policy being implemented to the development of advanced productive forces and the defence of the fundamental interests of the Chinese people through China’s advanced culture. [18] The reform policies were approved at the 11th Congress of the CPC (December 1978). The 14th Party Congress in November 1993 formalized Deng’s understanding of the “socialist market economy.” Jiang Zemin said, “To accelerate economic growth, we must first free our minds, speed up reform and opening up, and get rid of abstract discussions about what is socialist and what is capitalist.” With China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, in addition to expanding opportunities for the export of goods and capital, the CPC accepted many concessions in favour of international capital. [19] On November 15, 2002, at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao was elected General Secretary of the CPC, and on March 14-15, 2003, he was elected President of China. He summarized the fundamentals of China’s current and future policies with the formula “Peaceful Development, Peaceful Rise, Harmonious Society, and Harmonious World.” The 17th Party Congress declared its determination to continue with “market economy” reforms. Xi Jinping, who was elected General Secretary at the 18th National Congress of the CPC held on November 15, 2012, and President of China on March 14, 2013, pointed to more ambitious and comprehensive goals such as the “Chinese Dream,” the “New Normal,” and the “Belt and Road Initiative.” [20] According to the 20th Congress, the Chinese Dream encompassed the great awakening of the Chinese nation in line with Chinese values and socialism, and had a “two-stage” goal to be completed by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, and 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The CPC would realize a “moderately prosperous society” in line with Chinese values and socialism by 2021 and transform China into a modern socialist country by 2049! [21]
At the 18th Congress, it was announced that policies facilitating the free movement of Chinese capital in foreign countries and foreign capital in the Chinese market would be developed and continued in line with the understanding of the necessity of a market economy and private property relations. Under the “New Normal” economic policy announced by Jinping in 2014, the rights of foreign companies were guaranteed by the state in order to increase direct foreign investment in China. With the amendments made to the Foreign Investment Law in 2016, foreign capital was allowed to operate freely in all sectors and areas not covered by the “negative list,” which covers some important and special areas. [22] Accordingly, the CPC would use state power to peacefully evaluate the international mechanisms of monopolistic capitalist economies, use science and technology for the benefit of the world’s peoples without pursuing any hegemonic goals, and serve to produce results that would benefit everyone.
At the 19th Party Congress held on October 19-24, 2017, Xi Jinping was re-elected as President and General Secretary of the Party and made a speech titled “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. He talked about “continuing in a new historic context to strive for the success of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” and said “It will be an era of securing a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and of moving on to all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country.” [23] At the December 2020 meeting of the Politburo of the CPC, Xi Jinping spoke of putting an end to ”irregular expansion of capital” and exerting pressure on billionaires, noting that the gap between the rich and the poor was widening.
These and numerous other examples clearly demonstrate the capitalist nature of current economic relations in China, leaving no room for exaggeration or ambiguity.
China’s NEP?
Xi Jinping says that the “initial stage of socialism” is “a unique historical stage of China’s socialist society” and that “this stage will continue for at least 100 years until socialist modernization is largely realized.” [24]
The CPC and its followers, who believe that it is “advancing on the path of building socialism,” refer to this policy as Lenin -Stalin’s CPSU in the 1920s in the Soviet Union as an “inevitable and necessary” measure, citing the NEP (“New Economic Policy”) that was introduced as a “forced retreat / step back.” However, these two examples, far from being identical or equivalent, exhibit contrasting characteristics.
The NEP was a policy under Lenin’s leadership, and in Lenin’s words, of the Socialist Soviet Republic, to reorganize its devastated and backward economy, for the sake of liberating the proletariat and the broad peasant masses from exploitation, under state control and for a temporary period, in a way that would include a “return to capitalism.” [25]
It had two aspects. First, it was a policy of concessions within the framework of a “direct, official, written agreement with advanced Western European capitalism,” in which profits and losses were calculated and the duration of privileges was determined by the workers’ state. This was a policy of concessions with the purpose of strengthening the social and political position of the proletariat by allowing capitalism to develop under the control of the revolutionary class power, in conditions where state power was in the hands of the working class. In Lenin’s words, “state capitalism in the form of concessions” was a step backward.
“Privileges,” said Lenin, “are an agreement, a bloc, an alliance between the Soviet power, that is, the proletarian state, and the patriarchal and petty-bourgeois small property owners in the form of state capitalism. The Soviet power cultivates state capitalism in the form of privileges, strengthening large enterprises over small ones, the advanced over the backward, and machine labour over manual labour, increasing the quantity of large industrial products under its control (the portion of production to be delivered), and strengthening state-regulated economic relations as opposed to small-bourgeois anarchic relations.” [26]
This was a cautious policy of concessions. It was linked to the goal of raising the level of production and improving the situation of workers and peasants, and it also had great benefits for capitalists. What would determine the outcome was the struggle linked to the goal, which must never be neglected.
Noting that the tasks in the economic sphere were even more difficult than those in the military sphere, Lenin stated that “a retreat that could only be described as a heavy defeat and a retreat” had become necessary, and that the NEP, announced in the spring of 1921, would inevitably be successfully implemented by taking advantage of the concessions policy as quickly as possible. The new economic policy meant replacing forced grain-requisitioning in the countryside with taxation, transitioning to a significant reestablishment of capitalism, entering into privileged agreements with foreign capitalists, leasing to private capitalists, etc., in order to open up opportunities and space for capitalist development. Lenin states that the issue was who will come out on top, noting that with capitalist development the proletariat will objectively grow in strength, that in terms of the outcome, who acts first is of decisive importance; that the proletarian state power, relying on the peasantry, had to succeed in reining in the capitalist class “inevitably” in order to bring capitalism “under the state’s control and create a capitalism that is subordinate to and serves the state.” [27]
This was a policy implemented under conditions in which the world bourgeoisie mobilized all its resources to destroy the socialist government, and the capitalists did not give up on their attempts to eliminate all the gains of the revolution and return to the old order. Success or the outcome of the struggle depended on the organization of the peasantry in line with the goals of the revolution through the development of the productive forces. The state would meet the needs of the peasantry through industrial production, the peasantry would meet their needs through trade, the workers would use their strength to strengthen the power of the proletarian state, and the development of large-scale industry would thus become more possible.
In his report dated March 6, 1922, titled “The International and Domestic Situation of the Soviet Republic” Lenin said this: But we can now say that, so far as making concessions to the capitalists is concerned, the retreat is at an end. We have weighed up our own forces and those of the capitalists. We have done some reconnoitring by way of concluding agreements with Russian and foreign capitalists, and we say, and I hope, I am sure, that the Party Congress will say the same, officially, on behalf of the ruling party of Russia: ‘We can now stop our economic retreat. Enough! We shall not retreat any further….” Lenin goes on to say that economic difficulties persist, but that no further concessions should be made. He says that capitalists will expect concessions to be extended, but that we must tell them “’Enough! Tomorrow you will get nothing.” [28]
In China, on the other hand, there has been 75 years of capitalist development under the pretext of temporarily developing capitalism under state control and in the service of creating the material social conditions for socialism. The Chinese government’s claim that it has built socialism in China without setting limits on decades of capitalist development and without moving toward ending capitalist private property relations is nothing more than a fairy tale. When Xi Jinping was elected president and party secretary for the third time, he spoke of the social goal of “common prosperity”, which was initially put forward by Deng Xiaoping. The fact that the path China has taken under the CPC leadership—of which Deng was a key figure—has been shaped by the exploitation of hundreds of millions of proletarians and rural poor serves as clear and striking evidence that what will continue to be built in the not-too-distant future is not socialism.
In 2024, Xi Jinping promised that income would be distributed more fairly and taxes would be adjusted according to income in the name of “socialism.” The economic policies he promised are essentially no different from those sometimes hypocritically mentioned by some bourgeois liberals and included among the promises of liberal social democracy. The claim that Xi Jinping’s administration is strengthening the material and social foundations of socialism through its policy of promoting capitalist development for a century, with 2049 as the target date, is a distortion. Despite his frequent references to Marxism in his speeches at the Congress and Central Committee platforms, Xi does not even promise to end surplus value exploitation, but only speaks of the transition to socialism.
Can Discourse Conceal Reality?
In the document titled “The CPC: Its Mission and Contributions” published by Xinhua on August 26, 2021, the Central Committee of the CPC points out, among other things, that the CPC resolutely implemented reforms and opening up during the Deng Xiaoping era, that it “created socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and “transformed China into a country open to the world.” It also states that “China’s Communists, with Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping as their chief representatives, have adapted the basic tenets of Marxism to China’s realities and its traditional culture, and they have gone from victory to victory on their journey towards national rejuvenation.” [29]
In his speech at the 20th Congress of the CPC (October 16-22, 2023), where he was appointed as General Secretary for the third time, Xi Jinping stated that “Chinese Communists are keenly aware that only by integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and fine traditional culture and only by applying dialectical and historical materialism can we provide correct answers to the major questions presented by the times and discovered through practice…”
Xi argued that the CPC established “basic socialist economic systems” and that within this system, the public and non-public sectors were important components and foundations of the “socialist market economy,” and that they emphasized the importance of continuing to make social ownership the fundamental basis while allowing other forms of ownership to develop. He stated, “We must unswervingly consolidate and develop the public sector and unswervingly encourage, support, and guide the development of the non-public sector,” ensuring that all forms of ownership is reinforced and develop together. [30]
The statements of the CPC Central Committee briefly mentioned the responsibilities of the individuals listed in the statements who contributed to the development of the concept of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in China’s rise to become a major power in the global capitalist system. Xi Jinping, who continues to promote the discourse of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” presents Chinese capitalism as a “socialist market economy” and supposedly proves the socialist nature of the economy through the existence and effectiveness of the state sector!
The dominant position and guiding role of monopolistic state capitalism or the state sector in the economy does not indicate a socialist mode of production. This is also evidenced by the nationalization/public ownership policies that bourgeois states have resorted to in the past for various reasons. There are numerous examples of certain critical sectors being operated and controlled by the state in countries dominated by imperialist and collusive monopoly capital. This is particularly evident in the arms industry, energy, and certain areas of technology.
Even if the share of the state sector or monopolistic state capitalism in the Chinese economy is debatable, the fact that the fundamental “principle” guiding the operation of this sector continues to be the production of surplus value, and that private capitalist enterprises in the Chinese economy are not only not decreasing in proportion but are constantly increasing and strengthening, undermines the Xi administration’s claims of building socialism. The Chinese administration recently announced a decision containing about thirty measures aimed at “providing a competitive environment on equal terms with state-owned companies for the private sector, developing financing opportunities, providing direct support, and involving the private sector in policy development and regulatory processes.” The insistence on continuing practices that empower the private sector even 70 years after the Chinese revolution is proof that it is capitalism that is developing and growing stronger. [31]
Xi Jinping, citing Deng Xiaoping, says that the “essence of socialism” is “the liberation and development of productive forces” in order to achieve common prosperity. In a statement made after the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee (October 2015), the goal of “improving people’s well-being, promoting their comprehensive development, and encouraging steady progress toward common prosperity” was also highlighted.
Xi also links the economic policy they follow to the free development of productive forces. Any reader with an average knowledge of Marxist analysis of commodity production, capital accumulation, and expanded reproduction knows that the fundamental condition of capitalist development is the exploitation of surplus value. Although the “contract” between the owner of capital and the owner of labour power in the capitalist market represents a liberation in the sense of a break from pre-capitalist ties, the various forms of pressure and control over workers, along with practices that increase absolute and relative surplus value exploitation, create barriers to free development. In the process of capitalist development, any relative or more concrete improvement in the living conditions of workers is both conditional on struggle and linked to production methods and tools developed for greater exploitation. For the productive forces—of which labour power is the living element—to truly develop freely, the conditions of exploitation of labour power must be eliminated.
In China, with capitalist development, the productive forces have indeed developed. Feudal relations have been dissolved, hundreds of millions of workers have joined the ranks of the proletariat, and advanced technology has served as an instrument of development, functioning as an exploitative factor to increase labour productivity and production. However, there is no data to show that China is moving forward in building a society in which exploitative relations are being eliminated. In China, even the partial steps taken toward nationalization in industry and agriculture after the success of the people’s revolution have been reversed, Despite the state apparatus remaining in the hands of the CPC and state capitalism (the public sector) continuing to exist, the private sector, domestic-foreign capital joint ventures, and direct foreign capital investment enterprises have expanded their areas of activity. As a result of decades of implementation of new economic policies, the expanding reproduction of capital has become the determining factor of the “market.”
The characteristic of the CPC leadership’s understanding of “common prosperity” is expressed in Xi’s words, which contain both hope and a call to action: “Humanity must realize that we are all in the same boat, that we must remain in harmony, that we must establish new forms of common development goals and global partnership relations.”
The call is addressed to “everyone,” but primarily to the rulers of today’s world. The Chinese government wants to use its large population, the productive energy of hundreds of millions of workers, and its network of international trade relations more effectively to “realize the Chinese dream.” This rhetoric serves to obscure the existence of social classes in irreconcilable conflict with the claim of class equality. The CPC and Xi’s rhetoric and goal of “common prosperity” echoes the rhetoric of “common prosperity and harmony of society” often espoused by politicians representing the ruling powers in the bourgeois world. While spokespersons for bourgeois governments and capitalist parties present this as a promise, the CPC under Xi claims that it will provide prosperity to all classes through the “socialist market economy.” Xi also asserts that China’s “common prosperity” policies and practices are and will be for the whole world. The “Belt and Road” project, announced in 2013 to connect Asian and European (Eurasian) countries and involve construction in a wide area from Central Asia to Africa, is also presented as serving China and the CPC’s “international common prosperity and development”! [32]
The leaders of the CPC say: “We will always pursue peaceful development, always follow a strategy of opening up for mutual benefit and common gain, striving not only for China’s own development, but also valuing our responsibility and contribution to the development of the world. We are working not only for the well-being of the Chinese people, but also for the entire world population. What the realization of the Chinese Dream will bring to the world is not chaos but peace; it is not a threat but an opportunity.” [33]
Chinese leaders say that the Chinese dream is a great opportunity for the whole world and all of humanity to move toward “common prosperity.” They say that “China has repeatedly declared to the public that it rejects all forms of hegemony and power politics, does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, and never seeks domination or expansion.” [34]
The Xi administration promises to send white doves, but “domination and expansion” are no longer achieved solely through direct occupation and annexation in the imperialist phase of capitalism. The establishment and development of dependency relationships through the export of capital, the development of debt-credit relationships, the establishment of partnerships, and the purchase of government bonds and shares have been among the most important defining features of bourgeois imperialist history, from the emergence of capital monopolies to the present day, in even more developed forms. It is known that China has such relationships with dozens of countries, alongside the activities of imperialist Western states in the Chinese market and China’s activities in their markets. In recent years, China has entered African countries with valuable mineral resources through capital exports and commercial activities.
And again, in connection with these developments, the mobilization of Western imperialist powers, led by American imperialism, against the spread of China’s influence in the world capitalist market, the intensification of trade wars, and the hardening of competition in the direction of military policy with “war preparations” statements are among the realities of today’s world. Capitalist great powers will try every means and method to prevent China’s “dream” from coming true. The reason for this is not China’s “socialism.” [35]
In the capitalist world, there is no aspect of the claim to work “for the entire world population” that is compatible with socialism. Such a claim can only have a certain meaning under the conditions of socialism being realized on a global scale. Through demagogic rhetoric, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) admit that they work for monopolies by claiming to work for everyone, from the monopolistic imperialist bourgeoisie to the poor rural workers, from the peoples of dependent countries to the big capitalists of the world, including Chinese bosses.
Although it is impossible to predict today what kind of world and what form of China will emerge at the end of the “initial stage of socialism,” which Xi has stated will last a hundred years, and during the hypothetical transition to the intermediate stage, this claim is completely unfounded in today’s Chinese reality. In China, where mysticism, utilitarianism, and eclecticism are the philosophical, ideological, and political stars reflected in its banner, social realities paint a different picture of China: hundreds of millions of rural workers in China are cheap labour, a source or means of profit for international and “domestic” capital. China has become a huge factory/manufacturing plant for the world capitalist market. Direct foreign capital investments in China have increased, and rapid capitalist development has both accelerated the flow of Western imperialist capital into the Chinese market and intensified exploitation. Imperialist countries, led by the US, and international monopolies operate in China, while Chinese monopolies operate in many countries around the world. It is also confirmed by Chinese sources that foreign capital operates freely in China, except in certain areas. The fact that certain critical sectors are closed to foreign capital activity is not solely the result of the skill or subjectivity of a state like China, which claims to implement a “socialist market economy,” but is also linked to global realities and power relations.
China’s development to a level where it will surpass the major imperialist capitalist countries in terms of economic size, immediately after the US, is directly linked to the exploitation and oppression of the working class and other labourers. To speak of a socialism built through decades of intertwined relations with international capital is a gross distortion, even a outright lie. The rhetoric of Chinese leaders about building socialism is linked to the goal of facilitating the spread of China’s capitalist reality by obscuring it. Since proletarian and labour uprisings that develop internally, together with international support, would weaken the “peaceful” power of sharing that is promised, it is considered beneficial to continue this deception. In China, state-private sector partnerships, domestic and foreign capital partnerships, and the activities of separate private capitalist companies, as well as the free activity of small and medium-sized enterprises in urban and rural areas, are among the main realities of the economy.
In China, the state has even included an article in the constitution stating that it will “allow the existence and development of the private sector” and “protect its interests and legal rights,” which, according to Xi Jinping, is necessary for “social harmony.”
This “social harmony” is based on the exploitation of labour power in a more effective and efficient manner for surplus value and profit, in order to facilitate the expansion and reproduction of Chinese and international capital. The policy of “ensuring that all forms of ownership reinforce and develop together” has served to advance capitalism. The state’s active role in the economy has not changed the capitalist character of the Chinese economy. With its population, economic capacity, military and technological capabilities, China has become one of the largest and leading powers in the world capitalist system. It is a major imperialist power that ranks among the top in competition through capital exports, loan agreements, and its weight in the trade network. [36]
The CPC leadership has promoted capitalist development and coordinated the reproduction of capitalist relations over decades, citing the low level of development of productive forces in China and the need to develop the material and social foundations for so-called socialism. While continuing to promote the rhetoric of building socialism and transitioning to communism as subparagraphs of a claim, the CPC revived “free market capitalism,” which guarantees private capitalist property, under the guise of “market socialism.” The creation of conditions for the activities of international monopolies in the Chinese market and Chinese capital in the international market was carried out in the name of China’s development and the provision and enhancement of the common welfare of society.
The CPC leaders, who turned different versions of pragmatism into congress decisions with the claim of successfully implementing “market socialism” over a century-long process, elevated Chinese capitalism to state-monopoly capitalism by expanding Mao Zedong’s understanding of power sharing with the national bourgeoisie and “cooperation with some other enemies against the main enemy” to “win-win” cooperation with imperialists and so-called peace. They elevated Chinese capitalism to state-monopoly capitalism. From the outset, it was accepted that commodity production, private property, and bourgeois rights could not be abolished for decades in the name of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, they have further opened the way for “capitalist travellers” to become dollar billionaires and millionaires through their liberalisation policies, enabling capitalist relations to become more influential in both urban and rural areas.
***
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has not yet removed the word “communist” from its name. CPC leaders continue to use the phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as an objective. The leaders of the CPC, which is said to have 96 million members, elects its governing bodies through periodic official congresses and governs the country, do not shy away from saying that Marxism is the “guiding ideology” in their various statements. [37] The CPC Politburo, in a statement issued on the occasion of the 19th Congress, stated that “the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics will fly high; Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development will guide the Party, and the essence of Xi Jinping’s important views will be fully implemented. Xi Jinping refers to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic (2049) as “the date of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the realization of the Chinese Dream” and wants people to have confidence that this will be achieved. [38]
However, the claim of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “New Marxism,” which is linked to the reality of China, is the product of an effort to cover up China’s capitalist social reality with vague and complex rhetoric, fuelled by ideological arguments based on developments in the historical period after 1949. The CPC is tasked with managing the bureaucratic apparatus in Chinese society and aims to achieve “common prosperity” with the bourgeoisie. There is no social and economic system in China where the principle of “to each according to his work” is valid, even on a rough scale. There are no governing workers’ bodies or communal formations of workers and urban-rural poor that those who envision China as a socialist country or at least a country in transition from capitalism to socialism, or who claim it to be so, could point to as evidence.
However, China possesses enormous revolutionary potential. This is because there is a historical accumulation of experience that cannot be compared to that of many other countries, which will eventually lead to the development of a struggle by hundreds of millions of proletarians and rural-urban workers to free themselves from capitalist exploitation. The Chinese working class, which constitutes more than a quarter of the world’s proletariat—and its new and genuine communist party, if it exists or is formed—will be a great support for the world proletariat and the oppressed peoples in their struggle against capitalist barbarism with its success in the struggle to create a China free of exploitation.
[1] Yazıcı, J. (2022) “Interview with Korkut Boratav,” Theory and Politics, https://teorivepolitika1.net/2022/02/22/ korkut-boratav-la-soylesi/
[2] Kayaoğlu, M. (2022) “Protests in China and Leftists Frightened by the Historical Power of Marxism,” Theory and Politics, https://teorivepolitika1.net/2022/12/06/cin-deki-gosteriler-ve-marksizmin-tarihsel-gucunden-urken-solcular/
[3] Those who view Mao Zedong’s eclectic and complex views on political, philosophical, economic, and military struggle as a higher stage of Marxism have emerged not only in countries such as Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Nepal, the Philippines, and Turkey, but also in Western European countries such as Germany.
[4] Mao Zedong was the great leader of the Chinese revolution. In his works, he spoke of class struggle, the contradictions between the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed, and the goal of socialism. He emphasized the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the importance of advancing the revolution under the leadership of the working class toward the construction of socialism. At times, he referred to Marxist theorists and quoted them. Some of his theses on Marxism-Leninism and the materialist worldview, as well as his approach to the problem of contradictions, led some to describe him as a “new and great theorist” of the socialist worldview. However, the main feature of Mao’s ideological and political views was their eclectic-dualistic nature. Despite being influenced by Marxism and quoting Marx and Lenin, he had an eclectic and complex style that was idealistic, at times linked to Confucianism, pragmatic in terms of political tactics, and included and proposed reconciliation with the bourgeoisie. Shaped by the role of the Chinese countryside in the people’s revolution and the role of the Chinese peasantry in the revolution, Sun Yat-sen took the “three principles of the people” as his guiding principle. In order to adapt Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese reality, he obscured scientific socialist views on revolution and class issues and transformed them into a theory of compatibility with the national bourgeoisie, mixed with arguments inspired by Confucian philosophy, theorizing from the outset that the compromise should be continued during the “transition period” by making the bourgeoisie a partner in power. For example, he states that the struggle against “the mountains of imperialism and feudalism” can only be victorious through the revolutionary mobilization of the masses; but he showed an approach that obscured a fundamental issue, namely, determining the necessary conditions for the struggle to achieve victory in terms of production relations and productive forces, and the relationship between the exploiting and exploited classes.
[5] Korbash, E. (1976) Maoist Economic Theories, trans. E. Koçbaş, Bilim Yayınları, Istanbul, p. 8.
[6] Suyin, H. (1993) Morning Storm 1: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, trans. C. Irmak, 2nd ed., Berfin Publications, Istanbul, p. 536.
[7] Cited by Dölek, L. (2007) “An Examination of China’s Socioeconomic Structure in its Historical Development,” Istanbul University Institute of Social Sciences Department of Finance, Master’s Thesis, p. 69.
[8] Suyin, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, p. 347.
[9] Zedung, M. (1975) Selected Works: Volume 2, Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, p. 119.
[10] Zedung, M. (1976) Selected Works: Volume III, Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, p. 251.
[11] Cited from Zedung by Parti Bayrağı (1979) “The Doctrine of Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Dictatorship, Socialist Construction, and ‘Mao Zedong Thought,’” Issue: 17, 10-62, pp. 28-29, https://www.dibar.net/dibar/dsm.html?yayin=pb 12 Party Flag, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
[12] Parti Bayrağı, op. cit., pp. 20-21.
[13] Zedung, M. (1978) Selected Works: Volume V, Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, p. 87. [14] At the beginning of the 1950s, there were 123,165 medium and small capitalist enterprises in China (85% of which employed fewer than 10 workers, and 164 of which employed more than 500 workers) (Suyin, H. (1995) Morning Storm: Volume 2: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution (1949-1975), trans. M. K. Bozkurt, Berfin Publications, Istanbul, pp. 71-72).
[15] The landlords, who made up 3% of the population and owned 26% of the arable land, had their land confiscated, but the wealthy and medium-sized landowners were left untouched. The wealthy peasants, who made up 7% of the population, owned 27% of the land. Middle peasants owned 25%, while poor and landless peasants, who made up 68% of the population, owned 22% of the land (Suyin, Sabah Tufanı: Volume 2, pp. 49-52).
[16] The CPC’s relations with the USSR and the CPSU reached a higher level and expanded in scope with the victory of the Chinese Revolution. Mao Zedong went to the USSR to seek assistance in building a new type of economic and social life in China. Agreements on joint defense and military support against external attacks on China were signed with the Soviet Union.
[17] Cited from Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett by Dölek, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
[18] CRI (2012) “The ‘Three Represents’ Thought,” http://turkish.cri.cn/862/2012/11/04/1s144092.htm
[19] Accordingly, all WTO member countries will be subject to the same practices in the Chinese market, foreign individuals and organizations will be granted equal commercial rights, and companies will have equal rights in domestic production and export-oriented production. Certain products, such as minerals, tobacco, grain varieties, and petroleum products, which are not subject to state monopolies, will be opened to foreign capital, and the TRIPS Agreement will be implemented upon accession. Within the first 12 years following accession, if Chinese products cause or threaten to cause harm to the domestic market of any WTO member country, customs tariffs would be reduced according to a schedule, and within a certain timeframe (for example, by 2004 for the majority and by 2010 for the rest), these tariffs would be reduced (to an average tax rate of 15% for agricultural products and 8.9% for industrial products). China would not provide export subsidies for agricultural products; in banking services, foreign financial institutions will be able to conduct foreign exchange transactions without customer restrictions from the first years of membership. WTO membership has also provided China with the opportunity to increase its exports and export to wider areas.
[20] On January 5, 2013, in a speech to the newly elected members of the Central Committee, Xi referred to Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reform and opening up” and said, “We took Marxism and made it Chinese. This is socialism with Chinese characteristics.” added, “If our party had not made a firm decision to implement reform and opening up in 1978, if it had not resolutely promoted reform and opening up, and if it had not faithfully grasped the correct direction of reform and opening up, socialist China might not be in such a gratifying situation today.” He constantly referred to Deng Xiaoping: “We will continue to deepen, explore, innovate, and advance reform and opening up, and we will continue to encourage institutional, theoretical, and practical innovations.” (Greer, T. (2019) “Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding Ideology,” Palladium, https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/#xvii)
[21] In his emphatic statement on Marxism and “Mao Zedong Thought,” Jinping said, “We cannot allow the gap between the rich and the poor to continue to widen—with the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. We cannot allow the wealth gap to become an insurmountable chasm,” referring to the gaps between regions, urban and rural areas, and the rich and the poor, and pointing to the defense of social justice and fairness as a solution, similar to what left-wing liberal or social democratic politicians in any capitalist country have done or will do (Michael, R. (2022) “China: A Socialist Development Model?” BRIC, 3(2), p. 44).
[22] Subaşı E. M. (2017) “Economic Growth, Poverty, and Income Inequality in China: Its Position in the World Economy,” Journal of Information Economics and Management, XII(I), p. 12.
[23] Cited by Karamurtlu, B. (2020) “The People’s Republic of China’s Global Hegemony Initiative in the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative,” DAAD, p. 65.
[24] Jinping, X. (2014) “Governing China,” Palladium, https://www.palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/#xvii
[25] In the transition from capitalism to communism, especially in the early stages of the process, the inevitability of the coexistence or intertwining of elements of capitalism and socialism makes it inevitable that the struggle to determine which of these will prevail will continue.
[26] Lenin, V. I. (1997) “‘On the Single Tax, Free Trade, and Privileges’”, Selected Works: Vol. 9, trans. S. Kaya and İ. Yarkın, Inter Publications, Ankara, pp. 208-9.
[27] Lenin, V. I. (1997) “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” Selected Works: Vol. 9, trans. S. Kaya and İ. Yarkın, Inter Publications, Ankara, pp. 288-89.
[28] Lenin, V. I. (1997) “Report on the External and Internal Situation of the Soviet Republic,” Selected Works: Vol. 9, trans. S. Kaya and İ. Yarkın, Inter Publications, Ankara, pp. 342-46.
[29] Cited by Boratav, K. (2021) “Anxiety in the West: Is China returning to socialism?”, Sol Haber, https://haber.sol.org.tr/ yazar/batida-tedirginlik-cin-sosyalizme-mi-donuyor-314888
[30] CPC (2022) “The Effort to Build a Modern Socialist Country in Every Respect and the High-Flying Banner of Chinese-Style Socialism, Report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” trans. A. Yaman.
[31] Oktay, F. (2023) “The Chinese economy and private sector in the first half of the year,” https://istanbulticaretgazetesi.com/tr/yazar-haber/ ilk-yariyilda-cin-ekonomisi-ve-ozel-sektor
[32] According to a report published by Peking University’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Chinese public enterprises have undertaken 3,116 projects in 185 countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, with the value of signed contracts exceeding $500 billion. H. Kozanoğlu wrote that $932 billion was spent on this. (Kozanoğlu, H. (2022) “China’s quest for ‘shared prosperity’”, Birgün, https://www.birgun.net/makale/cin-in-ortak-refah-arayisi-398965)
[33] For excerpts from Xi’s speeches, see Belt and Road Initiative Journal, 3(2), 16-23.
[34] Lotus (2024) “Xi: We are working for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the prosperity of the world’s peoples,” https://www. lotusnews.com.tr/xi-cin-ulusunun-yeniden-canlanmasi-ve-dunya-halklarinin-refahi-icin-calisiyoruz)
[35] Undoubtedly, if it were a socialist country—especially one of China’s size and power—all capitalist powers would again mobilize against it and attempt to neutralize it. However, competition and conflict with today’s China falls within the scope of competition and conflict between imperialist-capitalist powers.
[36] China’s economy, which was ranked 11th in terms of economic size in 1990, is now the world’s second-largest economy. With exports exceeding $2 trillion and imports of $1.6 trillion at the end of 2016, China is the world’s largest foreign trade country, reaching $15.4 trillion in 2020 and $18.6 trillion by mid-2023. It is the world’s largest exporter, second-largest importer, and the country with the largest foreign exchange reserves. It leads in the production and market share of steel, automobiles, and televisions. It is the country with the world’s largest e-commerce volume. It constitutes the world’s first or second-largest market for almost every product. Despite a significant reduction in China’s investments in US Treasury bonds in recent years, China had been the largest financier of US public deficits until a few years ago, with foreign exchange reserves of 3 trillion dollars, most of which were held in US dollars and invested in US government bonds. With a labor force of 791 million, China is both a target for foreign capital and a competitor to other imperialist powers on the international stage, thanks to its vast market and cheap labor pool. While monopolies from Western European countries like the US and Germany make huge profits in the Chinese market, China’s high-tech products are also in demand in these countries’ markets and others. The presence of state and private capitalist companies and international monopolies in the Chinese market, the exploitation of labor power, and the poverty of workers are among China’s fundamental realities. In 2016, the richest 1% of the population in China owned more than 30% of the total income, while the poorest 25% owned around 1%. Forbes magazine announced that there were 799 billionaires in China at the beginning of 2020. As of the end of 2019, 960,725 foreign companies had invested $2.15 trillion in China. Michael Roberts stated in a 2020 article that more than 90% of housing is privately owned (Roberts, op. cit., p. 36).
[37] In his report to the 20th Congress, Xi stated, “Our Marxist Party, with over 96 million members, is more united and more cohesive than ever before.”
[38] Politikyol (2017) “Korkut Boratav Writes on the CPC Congress,” https://www.politikyol.com/korkut-boratav-ckp-kongresini-yazdi
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