By Ahmet Cengiz
In an interview with Isaac Chotiner of The New Yorker, American political scientist and international relations theorist John Mearsheimer stated that the responsibility for the possibility of the Ukraine war lies with the US:
“I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, where afterward NATO issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just NATO expansion. NATO expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat…. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, NATO expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” [1]
The reason we are sharing these lines from this interesting interview, which refutes much of the propaganda spread especially in Western countries before and during the war in Ukraine, is that there is a prequel to Russia’s attack on Ukraine and, more importantly, it has dimensions that relativize an obvious aggression in the eyes of some left circles. Given this situation, it was only natural that confusion arose regarding the stance to take in the face of aggression. Interpretations such as “Yes, Russia attacked, but it was forced to do so,” or “this attack is actually a defence,” or “Russia could no longer stand by and watch the encirclement, it had to put a stop to it somewhere” found their way through this reality.
Of course, these issues can be dismissed by saying that everything has a backstory. However, this approach would amount to nothing more than ignoring the scope and uniqueness of what is at stake here. The fact is that it is not only Russia’s socialist past (the Putin administration exploits this memory, which is still alive in Russian society, at every opportunity and with all its symbols), but also its relative economic weakness in the face of today’s dominant, aggressive, and world-ruling imperialist states, its inability to escape being a target of these powers, and its inability to break free from its position as a rising power, greatly complicate the assessment of Russia, its policies, and its orientations. We can also put it this way: Russia presents an atypical appearance among the current imperialist states. For example, China’s situation is relatively clearer, as its level and pace of development have suppressed its atypical aspects. The situation in Russia is somewhat different, as the evolution of its atypical aspects into typical ones is still ongoing in painful forms. In short, the aforementioned unique situation plays an important role in the ambivalent assessment of Russia’s attack and invasion in the Ukraine war by some circles on the left, and even in the inability of some to say that Russia should withdraw from Ukrainian territory, despite correctly characterizing Russia as imperialist.
It should be emphasized that the confusion caused by Russia’s special situation is not limited to the current war. The confusion actually begins with Russia’s assessment. The claim that Russia is not an imperialist state is the most striking example of this. In fact, this claim lacks the substance that would require a special discussion. However, at a time of war with far-reaching implications and, in Clausewitz’s words, “the fog of war” is rapidly spreading, the fact that individuals and political parties that call themselves Marxist repeat this claim, hence further spreading the current confusion, makes it necessary to discuss this issue from many angles.
This article will not be an empirical analysis of Russia, but rather will seek to demonstrate the warped logic behind the claim that Russia is not imperialist, which arose from the formalization of Lenin’s theory of imperialism, and the fact that this logic is indefensible in the name of Marxism.
IT IS NOT, BECAUSE…
The main argument of those who say that Russia is not imperialist is the relative weakness of the Russian economy compared to other powerful imperialist states and the relative underdevelopment of certain fundamental characteristics due to this weakness. It is a fact that Russian economy is weak.. For example, Mearsheimer, mentioned above, points out that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product is “smaller than that of Texas.” However, the issue is not the fact itself, but the conclusions drawn from it. As will be seen in the examples we will give, the approach of those who claim that Russia is not imperialist is marked by a clear positivism and schematism; or rather, what we see is the veiling of the schematism of Lenin’s theory of imperialism with “facts”.
To keep this article concise, we will focus on two examples from Turkey and Germany that represent the fact that this claim is advanced by various left circles in many countries. It can be said that Hazal Yalın provided the most extensive justification for this claim in Turkey in her book Russia: Collapse, Rise, and Dynamics[2]. In Germany, this issue is still being debated across a broad spectrum of the left. It will suffice here to mention the debates within the DKP, which comes from the revisionist tradition. While the party’s youth organization, SDAJ, characterizes Russia as imperialist, the party leadership distances itself from this definition.
It should be noted that Yalın’s book “Russia” is based on extensive research, particularly in the economic sphere. We do not intend to review that book here, and will suffice to say that the author knows Russia and the Russian language well and has translated many works of Russian literature into Turkish. Setting aside the fact that some of his preconceptions contrary to Marxism have prevented him from drawing multifaceted conclusions from his empirical work, we want to focus solely on his fundamental argument that Russia is not imperialist.
A common feature of those who argue that Russia is not imperialist is that they approach Lenin’s famous five points summarizing “the basic characteristics of imperialism” with a formal logic, which can be summarized as follows: “If these five points are the fundamental characteristics of imperialism, then we must examine whether these characteristics apply to today’s Russia”, and they come to the conclusion that “If one of these characteristics is weak or absent, then that country is not imperialist”!
For example, Yalın also cites the five points in the conclusion of his book. He then makes an interesting classification of these points and concludes that Russia is not imperialist based on the eight points he summarizes in his empirical study: “Russia is a capitalist economy within the imperialist world system; in terms of its structure, it is no different from an average peripheral economy. However, it operates on the Soviet legacy through a strong and continuously reinforced state capitalism; this serves as an obstacle to its colonization.”[3]
Yalın arrives at this conclusion through an interpretation that separates the internal connections of the five-point definition he quotes from Lenin. And he lays down the following argument:
“The first two stages (i.e., “1. the concentration of production and capital to the point where out of it has grown monopolies that play a decisive role in economic life; 2. the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this ‘finance capital’, of a financial oligarchy”) not only characterize imperialist countries, but also all countries in the imperialist world system; in other words, whether colonial or imperialist, all countries in this world system have completed the first two stages… There is no capitalist country within the imperialist world system that has not created monopolies and a financial oligarchy. Comparing these two stages across different countries essentially presents us with a quantitative picture… The other stages[4] directly define imperialist countries, meaning that we now have a qualitative picture; therefore, these are the main criteria for determining a country’s position in the world system relative to others. Once again, the hallmark of the system is capital export, which directly produces imperialist hegemony.”[5]
“In any case, Russia’s capital export is extremely weak; capital outflow is not export but rather capital flight, and this is done through offshore accounts as well as illegal capital outflow. (…) The Russian bourgeoisie has a strong tendency to hoard money, but a very weak tendency to make productive investments.”[6]
We will come back to Yalın’s conclusions later, but first let us quote a very similar approach by Patrik Köbele, chairman of the German Communist Party (DKP). He also claims that the first two points apply to Russia, but that the third point, namely “the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance” does not.
“In my opinion, this third characteristic does not seem to apply to Russia. Most of the capital leaving Russia goes to tax havens such as Cyprus, Switzerland, or Luxembourg. In my view, these do not serve to merge with other capitals in the sense of capital export as intended by Lenin. One of the three criteria, in my assessment, is not met. Therefore, I am inclined to think that Russia is a capitalist country that has not yet reached the imperialist stage.” [7]
When Köbele says “one of the three criteria,” he is referring to the first three of the five points summarized by Lenin. While Yalın, above, renders the first two points meaningless in terms of definition with an interesting interpretation, Köbele makes a more crude classification: “As you know, Lenin mentions five characteristics when describing imperialism. The first three are related to the development of the national economy, while the latter two are related to the development of international relations.”[8]
WITH LENIN AGAINST LENIN
Yalın’s observation above, namely that “comparing these two stages (i.e. the emergence of monopolies and the creation of a financial oligarchy on the basis of finance capital as an expression of concentration of production and capital) between different countries essentially provides us with a quantitative picture”, appears at first glance to be a statement of the obvious. Yes, unlike in Lenin’s time, today monopolies and finance capital exist in almost every country where capitalism has developed to a significant degree. However, there is an important difference between monopolies and finance capital in non-imperialist capitalist countries and those in imperialist countries. In the context of this definition, it is wrong to interpret this difference as a purely quantitative one, as Yalın does.
Therefore, it is wrong to remove these two characteristics from the “main criteria for determining a country’s position in the world system relative to others”. This is because the quantitative difference in size between the monopolies and finance capital of imperialist countries and those of capitalist countries also brings with it another difference that is not purely quantitative. For example, who controls whom among these monopolies and finance capital, who dominates the market, who can impose their own conditions on whom, or who is dependent on whom? These issues should not be excluded from determining the “position” of the relevant countries within the system. For example, if the main purpose of monopoly is to limit competition and secure market dominance, then it cannot be meaningless that the quantitative size of the monopoly and finance capital of certain major imperialist states corresponds to a clear difference in position in terms of the nature and function of monopoly compared to the monopoly and finance capital of another capitalist country.
This means that the factual existence of monopoly and finance capital in all capitalist countries does not eliminate the qualitative difference in the position of monopoly and finance capital in imperialist countries compared to others. The real issue is not the abstract factual existence of monopolies and finance capital in individual countries, but rather what kind of concrete relationship their general existence corresponds to within the imperialist system, and whether this relationship has led to a qualitative change in the position of imperialist country monopolies vis-à-vis other capitalist countries during Lenin’s time. It is precisely because this relationship has not led to a qualitative change that Russia has sought to protect its monopolies and finance capital through state capitalism.
Lenin’s holistic definition is being cut and tailored to suit the needs of each example we have given, that is, to suit people’s ideas. Yet, in Lenin’s general definition, each item has an internal connection with the others and forms a whole. Another example: According to Yalın, the “hallmark” of the imperialist world system is capital export. Although this observation points to an obvious fact at first glance, it actually undermines Lenin’s theory of imperialism. It is clear that capital export in the era of imperialism becomes meaningful on the basis of the concentration of production and capital, the existence of monopolies as an expression of this, and the formation of finance capital. Otherwise, capital export itself is not a phenomenon that first emerged with capitalist imperialism. But it is precisely this basis that distinguishes it from previous forms of capital export. In fact, if the above approach were adhered to, it should be said that this also presents a “quantitative picture”. For example, many non-imperialist capitalist countries, such as Turkey, also export capital today. Furthermore, capital export does not directly produce “imperialist hegemony”. For it to do so, it must be interconnected with other factors at the same time. In other words, the hegemony produced through capital export is possible only in conjunction with the contexts mentioned above (and others, such as commercial, financial, and military contexts) related to monopolies and finance capital.
Russia’s capital exports may be relatively low, but this does not mean that they do not exist. Capital exports carried out by state capitalism in Russia do not lose their nature as capital exports simply because the state is involved. According to IMF data from 2005-2020, Russia became a net capital exporter after 2010. While its net position in 2005 showed a deficit of $31.866 billion, net capital exports between 2010 and 2020 rose from $18.409 billion to $517.023 billion. So, it may still be low compared to other imperialist states, but the significant increases are evident. As for private capital, this capital going abroad is not only for yachts and villas, but also for investment in foreign companies wherever possible, be it in former Soviet countries or in the West. The fact that the scale of this is relatively small or that it is very convoluted and secretive due to concerns about tax evasion is a separate issue.
In other words, the current level of Russia’s capital export is not a matter of whether it exists or not (it clearly does), but rather that it has not yet developed this feature to the same extent as other imperialist countries due to the unique conditions of its capitalist development. The data indicates that it has made some progress in overcoming this weakness, though inadequate yet. If Lenin’s definition were fully understood, it would be self-evident that any imperialist state always seeks to compensate for its weaknesses in one area with its strengths in another.
The issue is approached with the understanding that “if one or two of the five points are missing, then it cannot be called imperialism”, as if Lenin were talking about a chemical formula. Of course, in making this criticism, we are not saying that the five points in question are insignificant or that one is important and the other is not. We are saying that this approach breaks the integrity of the definition, and is not Marxist. It is more a reflection of positivism, which revisionism has introduced into Marxism and which disregards the general context as one of its fundamental characteristics. This approach treats imperialism as a whole in itself and is reminiscent of modern revisionism’s treatment of socialism as a social formation in itself, and its distortion, in order to justify its opportunist policies, of the fact that socialism is only the first stage/phase of communism.
Lenin’s definition of imperialism has an internal connection and wholesomeness but it does not mean that he treats imperialism as something in its own right. In Lenin’s view, imperialism is not a social formation that replaces capitalism in its own right. Imperialism does not fundamentally change capitalism, nor can it (Lenin). Lenin states this clearly in the materials for the revision of the party programme:
“Imperialism complicates and sharpens the contradictions of capitalism, it “ties up” monopoly with free competition, but it cannot do away with exchange, the market, competition, crises, etc… The essential feature of imperialism, by and large, is not monopolies pure and simple, but monopolies in conjunction with exchange, markets, competition, crises. It is therefore theoretically wrong to delete [in the programme] an analysis of exchange, commodity production, crises, etc., in general and to “replace” it by an analysis of imperialism as a whole. There is no such whole… Furthermore, in the case of Russia it would be wrong to present imperialism as a coherent whole (imperialism in general is an incoherent whole), since in Russia there are no few fields and branches of labour that are still in a state of transition from natural or semi-natural economy to capitalism.” [9]
If imperialism is not a coherent whole, then to put forward Lenin’s five-point general definition, which he made with great caution and warning, as a template is to treat imperialism as a whole, contrary to Lenin. To prove this, let us turn to the opposite, that is, using the approach and perspective we criticized above as a criterion, let us see whether Lenin himself conformed to these friends’ reading of Lenin. As is well known, Lenin said that during the First World War, “military and feudal imperialism were dominant” in Russia, and sometimes he referred to Russia as “military-absolutist-feudal imperialism”. If it is objected that Lenin used these expressions before writing his book Imperialism, we should immediately note that Lenin not only retained these characterizations but also elaborated on them further. For example, in his article The Results of the Debate on the Right of Nations to Self-Determination, written after his book Imperialism, he described Russia with the following adjectives: “… tyrannical, medieval, economically backward, military-bureaucratic imperialism.”[12] Here and elsewhere, he also used the term “Russian social imperialism” when criticizing those who defended the social chauvinist line in Russia. In addition, Lenin referred to Britain as “colonial imperialism” and France as “usury imperialism”.
Russia’s relative economic backwardness did not prevent Lenin from including Russia, “a country most backward economically”, “a country enmeshed in a particularly close network of pre-capitalist relations”, in “modern capitalist imperialism”. The relatively weak development or backwardness of this or that aspect of any particular imperialist country was not the subject of a stereotypical assessment that strayed from the essence of the matter. On the contrary, as he stated in his article “The Split in Imperialism and Socialism”:
“The last third of the 19th century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital not of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc., partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital.)” [13]
Many more examples could be given, but let us leave it there. The conclusion is clear: Based on the approach to the definition of imperialism in the examples we have given, Lenin’s approach to Russia’s imperialist nature, as we know it, is contrary to the approach of these friends who have read Lenin! Lenin does not fall into a narrow-minded positivism that focuses on the object, arguing that “since a great power has not yet fully met one of the criteria of imperialism, such as being economically backward or unable to compete with other imperialist powers in terms of capital export, it cannot be defined as imperialist”. Nor does he fall into the trap of defining the state in question as an imperialist power based on its ability to export capital.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Let us conclude the issues of approach and method and move on to the historical aspects of the matter.
Lenin, who sometimes referred to imperialism as “modern capitalism,” explains the meaning of the term “contemporary” in this context as follows:
“Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres. Economically, the main thing in this process is the displacement of capitalist free competition by capitalist monopoly.” [14]
We see that the imperialism analysed by Lenin is a form of capitalism that emerges as a result of the internal development of free capitalism, as a special sharpening and intensification of the contradictions inherent in free capitalism, and thus as the highest stage of its development. It is clear that Lenin’s general definition essentially encompasses the changes within this process. Therefore, today, nearly 150 years after the end of the free-competitive era and more than a century after the emergence of monopolistic capitalism, it must be noted that the forms that any capitalist country will take as it acquires imperialist characteristics may not be entirely identical to those in the transition from free competition to monopoly, but may exhibit differences, and that the development of these characteristics will take place under the conditions of the existence of imperialist states and their fierce competition and pressure, which will bring with it numerous modifications and deformations. To ignore this would be to view history through abstract formulas.
However, aside from the general inaccuracy of reducing Lenin’s theory of imperialism to ahistorical templates, if there is one country where such an approach can never be correct, it is surely Russia. Why? Because Russia has experienced an unprecedented process in history. It is a country where socialism was built over a long period of time, whether you say 40 years or 70 years, where at a certain stage of its development, there was a shift toward the restoration of capitalism under socialist forms, and then a transition to open capitalist forms. It is a country that has witnessed an unprecedented event in history—the reversal from socialism to capitalism—and has undergone an extremely unique process in this regard. It is clear that the assessment of whether such a capitalist country is imperialist or not requires consideration not only of the facts but also of a dialectical analysis of the uniqueness of its history and how this uniqueness has conditioned it.
This is not being done. DKP President Köbele makes a very limited statement on this aspect of the issue. That statement essentially relativizes the meaning of the existence of the fundamental characteristics mentioned in the first two items of the definition (in short, monopolies and financial oligarchy based on finance capital) in Russia with regard to its Soviet past. [15]
Yalın, on the other hand, addresses this issue in greater detail: “The fundamental originality of Russian capitalism is this: in this country, modern capitalism did not emerge from feudalism, but from socialism, that is, (among other things) from the rejection of a socialized, giant industrial production.”[16] However, as we shall see, Yalın evaluates this obvious originality as a result of Russia’s inability to become imperialist. He assumes that Putin’s economic policies, in contrast to Yeltsin’s, have seemingly brought out characteristics that prevent Russia from becoming imperialist.
Let us examine this issue more closely. Yalın’s empirical study presents the following picture:
“After 2000, a planned state capitalism based on the energy sector was adopted; oligarchs who were inclined to merge with international monopolies in strategic areas and cede control to them were either completely eliminated or subdued; political power was completely restructured, establishing a troika based on the president representing the unity of the country, the army (more broadly, the security bureaucracy) with its rising prestige and elite status, and traditional foreign policy; measures were taken to prevent the rise of the middle bourgeoisie, while the influence of private or state monopolies was eliminated, particularly in foreign policy and issues concerning Russia’s territorial integrity… Thus, the most important factor in the shaping of Russia’s economy and political-social structure after 2000 was the increasing weight of state capitalism.”[17]
Without getting bogged down in numbers, let us just say that the data confirms the existence of strong state capitalism. According to Igor Artemyev, head of Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), as reported by Yalın, “In 2005, 35% of GDP was produced by the state, while in 2015 this figure rose to 70%.” Yalın also quotes Artemyev’s observation, which he finds “extremely apt”, saying that it is “of fundamental importance for understanding Russia’s current social and political order”: “In Russia, the process of ‘nationalization of the economy, establishment of monopolistic state capitalism, and fusion of business and power’ is underway.” [18]
Yalın concludes from the increasing weight of state capitalism in important sectors: “All of this points to an extraordinary concentration of capital. However, we see that oligarchs are kept away from sectors controlled by the state, primarily energy, heavy industry, and to some extent banking. This is a picture that does not fit with the nature of the imperialist system. Similarly, we observe that the tendency toward consolidation of banking and industrial capital outside the state sector is weak. The almost sole exception to this is the relationship between AlfaBank and telecommunications. Within the state sector, these two capital groups are inseparably united. The fact that mining and metallurgy are almost entirely left to the oligarchs completes this intriguing picture.”[19]
The picture is indeed interesting, as it indicates that we are not dealing with an ordinary situation, and therefore, the “ordinary” imperialist country formations cannot be expected! Before we get to whether we can draw the conclusion that this picture is “inconsistent with the nature of the imperialist system,” we should also mention other interesting points that Yalın mentions in his empirical study but does not dwell on in terms of drawing conclusions. For example, we can also glean the following information from his research:
“A special understanding of ‘state for the state’ has emerged: in this understanding, both the entity awarding the tender and the entity receiving it are state institutions. Some private companies, however, are exempt from competition and enjoy privileged status through direct purchases and concessions: for example, the Kerch Bridge (owned by Arkady Rotenberg) was awarded to Stroygazmontaj in this manner.”[20] Stroygazmontaj is not of interest to us here; rather, the information mentioned in Yalın’s footnote (!) about Rotenberg is quite interesting:
“Rotenberg’s story can be seen as another way of removing oligarchs from their areas of activity in Russia. Rotenberg is known as a friend of Putin. Following the sale of Stroygazmontaj, Rotenberg’s other major construction company, Stroyproyekt Holding, formed a partnership with the VEB (External Economic Bank) State Development Company, and Natsproyektstroy was established. This is a state corporation; however, it also serves as evidence of Rotenberg’s close ties to the state. Now, Natsproyektstroy must also be awarded major infrastructure contracts. It is actually very difficult to name this phenomenon: are the oligarch’s properties effectively being nationalized, with him appointed as a lifelong manager? It seems that the 1990s era of plunder, which supposedly opened the doors to oligarchy under the guise of “statecraft,” is now experiencing its own antithesis; the doors are opening for a transition from oligarchy to “statecraft.”[21]
Is it really that difficult to name the event we are witnessing? We learned from Artemyev that the construction of monopolistic state capitalism does not prevent the “merger of business and power,” but rather brings it about. From Yalın himself, we read that the “plundering era of the 1990s” is experiencing its “own antithesis,” meaning that this time, the doors to the transition from “oligarchy to ‘statesmanship’” are opening. Clearly, there is also a fusion between “business and the state” at the individual level.
Yalın’s references to Russia’s top 50 companies also provide insight into this convergence. According to this table, the first four largest companies (Gazprom, LUKOYL, Rosneft, and Sberbank, respectively) are not entirely state-owned companies, but rather have a capital structure in which the state owns 50.1% or 50.2%, with various percentages of private and legal entities also being partners in these giant monopolies. As to Yalın’s “mysterious” second-largest company, LUKOYL (though there is no definitive information), according to the knowledge of “Vagit Alekperov, who heads the company,” “50% belongs to foreign investors, 20% to himself, and 10% to his deputy chairman Leonid Fedun”. [22]
In conclusion, we are faced with a complex oligarchy that includes prominent oligarchs. In this case, it seems clear that monopolistic state capitalism in Russia has a class-based foundation that cannot be limited by the state consciousness of relevant state officials or nationalist motives such as keeping Russia’s head high. However, while Yalın does not entirely reject this reality, he fails to draw the correct conclusions from Russia’s unique characteristics highlighted in the introduction to this subheading and instead claims the following:
“State capitalism in Russia, while not entirely independent of large monopolies, is not simply a state capitalism organized solely for the needs of these monopolies. It has its own traditional priorities, among which is the principle of purging ‘strategic sectors’ of oligarchs and foreign influence (vulnerability). Can this situation continue indefinitely? Where and how should a limit be set? I do not know, (…) but … with its massive Soviet industrial legacy and its administrative tradition, it could continue far beyond expectations, and it is doing so.” [23]
It should be noted that Yalın does not see the forest for the trees. He does not seriously consider the implications of the class nature of the monopolistic capitalist state, but rather glosses over them. His focus is on the state’s dominance in the economy. However, this fact does not yet give any indication of whom this state serves, or whose class or group interests it primarily represents. As for the conclusion he draws from the reality of state capitalism, namely that it is not organized solely to serve the needs of these monopolies but has priorities that aim to purge strategic sectors of oligarchs and foreign influence, the following questions suffice: Do the “traditional priorities” mentioned above not align with the needs of the monopolies? Isn’t it clear that capitalism in Russia, which transitioned to open capitalist forms through a major collapse and looting, was forced to quickly adopt the form of monopolistic state capitalism if it was not to become openly colonial or semi-colonial? Doesn’t the country’s relatively weak economic structure require that economic life and construction not be subordinated to the interests of this or that (especially foreign capital-linked) private capital group? Especially since capitalism in the country is facing a major plunder and looting by the major imperialist states of the West (precisely by encouraging certain oligarchs and through them)? Therefore, isn’t it natural for certain monopolies, groups of capitalists, and the state, which are intertwined with finance capital oligarchy, to exist—ones that view the situation not through the lens of short-term capital group interests but rather from a longer-term perspective, and for this very reason foresee integration with the state, drawing strength from it to survive and develop in the face of destructive competition from foreign capital?
The examples given above show that this special fusion of “business and power” has already taken place, and that the monopolistic capitalist oligarchy in the country is forced to rely on the “Soviet industrial heritage” and “administrative traditions” not for the interests of Russia’s workers, but for its own monopolistic interests.
UNRAVELING INTERNAL CONTEXTS, EMERGING CONTRADICTIONS…
We have seen that some aspects of monopoly state capitalism, shaped by the historical uniqueness of the emergence of capitalism in Russia, do not correspond exactly to the formation of “ordinary” imperialism, and that this is wrongly considered as an indication that capitalism in Russia does not possess certain characteristics of imperialism. This results from the fact that the class perspective and analysis do not form the axis of this understanding. Indeed, the capitalist nature of the state is identified, but the fact that the state is capitalist is glossed over with an approach that is akin to a hunter lying in wait, content to simply wave at the prey that comes before him, rather than analysing it from a Marxist perspective! Furthermore, attention is drawn to “Soviet-like” elements in capitalism’s organization through the state, and these are put forward as indirect indications that monopolistic state capitalism in Russia is not yet imperialist.
Let us open a parenthesis here and make a brief note about the “Soviet-like” elements in Russia. When evaluating Russia, it makes no sense to deny the existence of such cultural (including traditional) formations and elements of consciousness. But these do not carry the meaning attributed to them by those who draw attention to this issue. Rather, they correspond to the issues explained by Ernst Bloch’s concept of “asynchrony”. Some cultural formations and elements of consciousness can continue to exist even though the infrastructure on which they were built has long since decayed or disappeared. Bloch, for example, notes that in the peasantry of 1930s capitalism, there are elements of consciousness that are “out of sync with our time because they are based on a kind of dead, numb, or at least disconnected infrastructure”. And he points out that this type of consciousness, behaviour pattern, and way of thinking that we encounter in peasantry, which “plough the land with the plough of the past and cultivate the field,” has a “politically asynchronous consciousness”. [24] In this regard, the asynchronous presence of “Soviet-like” cultural and consciousness elements in today’s monopolistic capitalist Russia is not contrary to the nature of things. Therefore, the fact that these elements are “Soviet-like” does not eliminate their asynchronous qualities. Meanwhile, the instrumentalization of asynchronous elements of consciousness by the ruling classes is not a situation unique to Russia.
Let us continue where we left off. Once again, we see that Lenin’s observation that capitalism “can only develop into capitalist imperialism at a certain, very high stage of its development” is understood in an abstract and mechanical way. For instance, the relatively weak nature of capital export can be interpreted as an indication that Russia had not yet reached the “imperialist stage” (Köbele). This assessment also implies that the essence of capitalism in Russia was a form of capitalism that took over the industrial infrastructure and cultural heritage of a more advanced society, meaning that while advancing in its capitalist development, it benefited from certain ready-made elements; this feature, in turn, led to the emergence of capitalism in Russia in distorted forms, thereby causing some aspects of imperialism to be strong and others to be weak.
In short, the analysis’ failure to be based on a class perspective prevents it from seeing the ordinary in the extraordinary in Russia. Since the analysis is essentially formal rather than class-based, it is as if the writings are reflected in a mirror, and although the image in the form is actually a reflection of a reversed image, the picture is read literally with a positive approach, and it can be said that “no, there is no picture here that corresponds to the nature of the imperialist system”.
In response to this approach, it is worth pointing out the distortions and contradictions that correspond to the transition from socialism to capitalism. To avoid prolonging this already lengthy article further, let us try to explain this with a metaphor. Our metaphor is a strange event depicted in the film “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” which shares its title with the story written by F. Scott Fitzgerald in 1922. To summarize the plot, Benjamin Button is born as a baby with the body of an elderly man. Naturally, he has a terrifying appearance. During the first examination, the doctor states that this baby’s bones are worn out, his skin is wrinkled, and with this physique, which corresponds to the final stage of development of an elderly man, he will not live very long. However, Benjamin Button’s development process proceeds in the opposite direction of that of a normal human being. As he grows older in age, he becomes younger physically. And when he reaches a very advanced age, he dies having physically transformed into a normal baby. What interests us here are the implications of Button’s life progressing in reverse, or rather, the implications specific to this reverse development: the mismatch between age and physical appearance, reverse imagery, self-form deformation, incongruity, and the dissolution of internal contexts. Benjamin, in his elderly state, actually plays with a girl his age, 8-9-year-old child. The scene that appears to be a grandfather playing with his granddaughter is, in fact, two young children playing together. Benjamin, with the physique of a 60-year-old man, becomes a sailor like a 20-year-old person. He appears to be an experienced sailor whose hair has been bleached by the sea, but in reality, he is a novice. At the age of eight, he develops dementia and can no longer recognize his loved ones.
Russia, which experienced a reverse development while transitioning from a socialist country to a capitalist one [26], has faced implications reminiscent of Benjamin Button’s peculiar condition at two turning points in its recent history. One of these turning points was the beginning of capitalist restoration under the conditions of socialism’s existence. The other was that, as a relatively young capitalist country, it transitioned to open capitalism from a level corresponding to the development of advanced capitalist countries, with its developed industrial infrastructure, massive army, and powerful state apparatus and bureaucracy. We will not examine these two turning points and their Benjamin Button-like implications one by one here. However, let us note the following: the self-form deformation and mismatches that emerged during the capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, through the dissolution of internal connections in the infrastructure-superstructure relationship, did not end when open capitalist relations were subsequently adopted. Since this was the case before, this time it faced other mismatches. For example, in Russia, the transition to open capitalist relations was made with a production capacity and concentration inherited from socialism, but a broad bourgeois class comparable to that seen in a capitalist country of similar level did not emerge. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie in Russia emerged with an oligarchic character from the outset, much like Benjamin Button being born as an old man. Or, as is well known, “normally” military power is a result of and relies on economic power. Russia, however, despite having a GDP comparable to that of Texas, possesses the world’s second-largest army and is the world leader in nuclear weapons capability. Other examples of non-correspondence and inconsistency could be given, but we believe our point has been made…
The truth is that today’s Russia is ruled by a financial-military-bureaucratic oligarchy formed by the fusion of capitalists, monopolists, and certain sections of the state bureaucracy. The formation in Russia is both a result of the peculiarities of the development of capitalism in the country and a reaction to the contradictory implications of these peculiarities.
What matters most is the class nature of monopolies and finance capital in Russia, their tendencies, and the objective realities of the imperialist era that dictate their preservation and strengthening as a whole. The fundamental drives of monopolies, such as maximum profit, and finance capital, such as capital accumulation, do not disappear when they originate in Russia or when there is state capitalism in Russia. Given both the class nature/motives of finance capital as the characteristic form of capital in our era and the fact that the imperialist states have completed the division of the world’s territories and spheres of influence, to think that such a large monopolistic capitalist state, whose characteristics and features we are discussing, could continue to exist without imperialist qualities is to abstract imperialism theory from the material relations and contradictions it expresses.
Russia is a capitalist imperialist country that possesses the fundamental characteristics of imperialism as defined by Lenin in his general definition, albeit in a unique and distinctive form. It is impossible for such a large and powerful monopolistic capitalist country, with its monopolies, finance capital, army, and vast underground and surface resources, to accept the position of an “average peripheral economy,” especially given the relentless realities of the age of imperialism. After all, one cannot sit quietly at the table of wolves. While some may think this is possible, there is no doubt that the oligarchy ruling Russia acts with full awareness of this reality.
If it does not want to be the victim of plunder and looting by other major imperialist states (which it cannot) and does not have a socialist system with the working class in power (which it does not), it must play a role in the redistribution of the world as a monopolistic capitalist country. Moreover, it has declared its intention to play this role in the famous speech made by its president at the 43rd Munich Security Conference, stating that “a unipolar world is unacceptable”. And Russia has made it clear not only through its attack on Ukraine but also through its previous moves that it is determined not to accept the “unipolar” order and the role assigned to it by other imperialist powers in this context. Behind this determination lies not the policy or preferences of a government but, fundamentally, the class position and objective interests of monopolies and finance capital.
As Lenin wrote in a letter in August 1916, “we cannot understand the current war without understanding the era.”[27] Russia is not outside the general era of imperialism or the current form of today’s imperialist world system. If we want to understand Russia’s reality, we cannot limit our horizon to its inverted image in the mirror. For all the contours of its reality become clear only within the general context of the imperialist era.
This article was originally published in Turkish in Teori ve Eylem (Theory and Praxis), No.56, 3/2022
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Notes
[1] Mearsheimer, J. (2022) “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine”, The New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine/amp?fbclid=IwAR0qlqr4j0grBKNLI_lgw9cxNT-S5IaocBxpJVF4zydr7cPjp11LGXwUgUs
[2] Yalın, H. (2021) Russia: Collapse, Rise, and Dynamics, NotaBene Publications, Istanbul.
[3] Yalın, op. cit., p. 162
[4] That is, the other fundamental characteristics summarized by Lenin: “3) capital export, unlike commodity export, acquires particular importance; 4) international monopolistic alliances of capitalists emerge to divide the world among themselves; 5) the division of the earth into territories among the most powerful capitalist powers is complete. Imperialism is capitalism at a stage of development where the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has been established, capital export has gained obvious importance, the division of the world among international trusts has begun, and the division of all the earth’s territories among the most powerful capitalist countries has been completed.” (From Yalın’s translation of Lenin’s book “Imperialism” from Russian, see ibid., p. 155)
[5] Yalın, ibid., p. 155, abç.
[6] Yalın, ibid., p. 158.
[7] Köbele, P. (2022) “Peace is only possible with Russia and China,” Unsere Zeit, https://www.unsere-zeit.de/frieden-geht-nur-mit-russland-und-china-2-168075/
[8] Köbele, op. cit.
[9] Lenin, V. I. Materials for the Revision of the Party Programme, LW, Vol. 24, p. 465, italics by Lenin.
[10] When making the definition mentioned in his book Imperialism, Lenin first states: “However, although the shortest definitions are useful because they summarize the fundamental characteristics, they are inadequate because they leave out some very important features of the phenomenon being defined. Therefore, without forgetting the relative and conditional value of all general definitions that fail to grasp many of the connections in the development process of a phenomenon, let us formulate a definition of imperialism that encompasses the following five fundamental characteristics” (Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, 7th Edition, Sol Publications, Ankara, p. 107, italics ours).
[11] Lenin, Socialism and War, LW, Vol. 21, p. 306
[12] Lenin, The Results of the Discussion on Self-Determination, LW, Vol. 22, p. 368
[13] Lenin, Imperialism and the Split in Socialism, LW, Vol. 23, p. 113.
[14] Lenin, Imperialism, p. 106.
[15] “In both cases, however, we must bear in mind that the historical feature of the transition to capitalism as a counter-revolutionary outcome is the high level of influence and property share of the capitalist state. This differs from highly developed monopolistic state societies such as Germany, the US, France, or Great Britain. Another difference is that Russian monopolies and oligarchs emerged from Soviet public ownership. This resembles the processes of primitive capital accumulation rather than the processes by which Western monopolies emerged from competitive struggles during the formation of imperialism.” (Köbele, op. cit.)
[16] Yalın, op. cit., p. 113.
[17] Yalın, op. cit., p. 115.
[18] Yalın, op. cit., p. 118, italics ours.
[19] Yalın, op. cit., p. 128, italics ours.
[20] Yalın, op. cit., italics ours.
[21] Yalın, op. cit., p. 119, italics ours.
[22] Yalın, op. cit., p. 121.
[23] Yalın, op. cit., p. 165.
[24] Bloch, E. (1973) Erbschaft unserer Zeit, Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 104–126.
[25] It is said that Fitzgerald was inspired by Mark Twain’s words when writing this story: “It is unfortunate that the best part of life is at the beginning and the worst part is at the end.”
[26] Of course, the Soviet Union was not limited to Russia, but since our topic is Russia, we are limiting ourselves to it.
[27] Lenin, Werke, Vol. 35, p. 205.